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1. Introduction 
 
The recent development of micro databases at the firm- and plant-level has provided 
empirical evidence that all manufacturers in an industry do not necessarily export their 
products to foreign markets.1 Indeed, the evidence suggests that firms with high 
productivities often export directly to foreign markets, whereas those with low 
productivities tend to sell their products only to domestic markets or exit the industry 
entirely. For this, seminal work by Melitz (2003), Helpman et al. (2004), Antràs and 
Helpman (2004), and Helpman (2006) provide a thorough theoretical grounding by 
constructing models featuring heterogeneous firms with differentiated products, various 
levels of productivity, and sunk and/or fixed export costs.  
For the most part, these studies demonstrate the sorting of firms by their level of 
productivity and thus consider the organization of firms according to their international 
behavior, including exporting, foreign investment, multinational cooperation, and 
offshoring. It is also worth noting that both the theoretical and empirical literature 
supports the so-called “self-selection” hypothesis, whereby exporters need a productive 
advantage before they commerce exporting. 
                                                  
1 In a representative survey of existing theoretical and empirical research, Bernard et al. 
(2007) consider “old” and “new” trade theories and their supporting empirical evidence. 
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    Recently, empirical studies have begun to focus on the role of intermediaries in 
international trade, i.e., trading (nonmanufacturing) companies such as wholesalers and 
retailers (e.g., Sogo Shosha in Japan).2 In particular, an important hypothesis in this 
body of research is that smaller firms prefer to export their products via trade 
intermediaries (i.e., as an indirect export), while larger firms prefer to sell their product 
directly abroad (i.e., as a direct export). For instance, using data from the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey conducted in Turkey in 2005, Abel-Koch (2013) shows that there is a 
significant negative correlation between firm size and the relative importance of indirect 
exports as opposed to direct exports. 
The following statement in Bai et al. (2017) very much inspires the current paper: 
“We treat intermediaries as agents who help export to rather than distribute in 
destination market” (emphasis added) (p. 123). This implies that “learning-by-exporting” 
(LBE) via intermediation affects the choice of export mode. That is, a manufacturing 
firm (hereafter, manufacturer) may be more likely to export directly following indirect 
exporting via a trade intermediary firm (hereafter, intermediary). Thus, focusing on the 
role of an intermediary, we consider the following problems. 
                                                  
2 For example, Bernard et al. (2010, 2011, 2015). For the empirical analysis of the 
wholesalers and retailers in international transactions, see Antràs and Costinot (2011), 
Crozet et al. (2013), MaCann (2013), and Tanaka (2013). 
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First, the choice of export mode by the manufacturer. We demonstrate that the 
choice of mode depends on, among other things, the marginal cost of the manufacturer.3 
That is, a manufacturer with a lower marginal cost prefers the direct export mode, 
whereas a manufacturer with a higher marginal cost prefers the indirect export mode 
through an intermediary. Second, the effect of LBE via an intermediary. For this, we 
consider the change of export mode, i.e., the transition from the indirect to the direct 
export mode, assuming the effect of LBE on the reduction of production and export 
costs. 
Studies by Ahn et al. (2011), Felbermayr and Jung (2011), and Akerman (2018) are 
closely related to the first problem. All these studies develop a theoretical framework 
based on firm heterogeneity and fixed export costs along the lines of Melitz (2003), and 
then provide empirical evidence concerning the relationship between the export mode 
and the size and productivity of manufacturers. However, while all three studies provide 
similar empirical results in demonstrating the first problem, there are some differences 
in their characterization of the intermediation sector.4 In particular, Akerman (2018) 
                                                  
3 Unlike the previous models, we treat the marginal cost of production as an important 
parameter, instead of firm size and productivity. 
4 Ahn et al. (2011) model the intermediary sector as being perfectly competitive with 
(homogeneous) intermediaries exporting on behalf of manufacturers. In this model, 
intermediaries purchase varieties from manufacturers at the same price as domestic 
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assumes that wholesalers (i.e., intermediaries) can handle many different goods 
produced by manufacturers at a given fixed export cost. This implies that wholesalers 
can save on fixed costs by handling many goods, i.e., economies of scope. Thus, 
Akerman (2010) derives the sorting pattern of manufacturers by including wholesalers 
able to spread the fixed exporting costs across more than one good, but ones that also 
need to charge an additional markup on the manufacturer procurement price to cover 
these fixed costs. In other words, the choice of export mode depends on the size and 
productivity of the manufacturer. In particular, because intermediated exports are 
associated with lower fixed export costs of gaining access to foreign markets, they are 
attractive options for small and rather inefficient manufacturers that wish to export their 
goods. As shown below in our analysis, we reflect this by employing Nash bargaining 
between a manufacturer and an intermediary in the indirect export mode. 
Several existing related studies explore the second problem, e.g., using the Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                  
consumers and incur an additional marginal cost of selling these abroad. In contrast, 
both Antras and Costinot (2010) and Felbermayr and Jung (2011) assume that there is 
an infinitely elastic supply of trade intermediaries in every country. Each manufacturer 
that finds it optimal to export via an intermediary then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, 
which specifies an upfront-fee for participation in the relationship paid by the 
intermediary. This fee can be positive or negative, and we may interpret it either as a 
franchising fee paid by an intermediary to a manufacturer or as a down payment of a 
manufacturer to an intermediary towards the financing of any fixed foreign distribution 
costs. 
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census data recording firm-level export transactions across products and countries, Ahn 
et al. (2011) show that firms using intermediaries in previous periods are more likely to 
export directly in subsequent periods than other firms, with the probability of a change 
from an indirect to a direct export mode of 35.7%. Although this result is only 
suggestive, it does provide the first known evidence that intermediaries facilitate 
participation in direct export. More recently, but also using Chinese data, Bai et al. 
(2017) develop a dynamic discrete choice model and provide transition rates of 0.111 (at 
the data base) and 0.137 (at the model base) for the change of an indirect exporter in the 
previous period to a direct exporter in the subsequent period. Drawing on these 
empirical findings, we develop a simple two-period model and theoretically examine 
the change from indirect to direct export modes. We find that if the effects of LBE on 
reducing the marginal production cost and fixed export cost are significantly large, if the 
market size of the foreign country is very large, and if the bargaining power of the 
manufacturer is sufficiently weak, then a manufacturer using an intermediary in the 
previous period can export directly in the subsequent period. 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the direct 
and indirect modes of exporting and after comparing the net profits of the manufacturer 
for both, provides the optimal choice of export mode. After assuming the effect of LBE 
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on the marginal product and fixed export cost functions, Section 3 demonstrates that an 
intermediary is an agent that will assist the manufacturer to change export mode and 
export directly. Section 4 summarizes our main results and outlines some remaining 
problems. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
2.1 Direct export mode and export costs: Self-selection hypothesis 
As shown in Figure 1a, there are two countries, home and foreign, with a manufacturer 
locating in the former and a competing firm in the latter. We consider Bertrand 
competition between the manufacturer and the foreign firm in a foreign market.5 To 
simplify the analysis, we assume the following linear demand functions: 
,FMM ppaq                                      (1) 
,MFF ppaq                                      (2) 
where subscript M (F) denotes the manufacturer (foreign firm) and .10    
We assume that the marginal cost of production of the manufacturer is given by 
                                                  
5 We assume that irrespective of the level of marginal cost, the manufacturer provides 
the product to the domestic market. Thus, to focus on the choice of export mode by the 
manufacturer, we need not analyze the manufacturer’s behavior in the domestic market. 
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,MMp cqC   ,0c  whereas that of the foreign firm is zero, i.e., .0FpC  Following 
heterogeneous firm trade theories, we assume that the manufacture must expend export 
costs where ,FtqC MMe   )0(t  denotes the tariff, transportation and distribution 
costs, and )0(F  is a fixed export cost reflecting the cost of entry into the foreign 
market and the startup cost of international business. This potentially includes 
employing labor working on foreign trade tasks, investment in foreign subsidiaries, 
building its own distribution network, and maintaining customer relations abroad. Given 
the above assumptions, the net profit functions of the two firms in the case of a direct 
export mode are: 
  ,FqtcpF MMMdMd                        (3) 
,FFFF qp                                       (4) 
where Md  )( F  is a gross profit of the manufacturer (foreign firm).  Using 
equations (1) and (2), and the first-order conditions (FOC) for profit maximization of 
both firms, we obtain the price and quantity of the manufacturer in the Bertrand 
equilibrium: 
,
4
)(2)2(
2
*



 ctapMd                                (5) 
,
4
)2(
2
2
**



 cAtcpq MdMd                         (6) 
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where   0)2()2(  taA   and .0
2
)0( *2  Mdqc
Ac   The foreign 
firm’s price and quantity are given by .
4
)()2( *
2
*
FF q
ctap 
 
  Hereafter, 
because we mainly analyze the behavior of the manufacturer, we do not explicitly 
discuss the foreign firm. 
Given the gross profit of the manufacturer is     ,2**** MdMdMdMd qqtcp   the 
net profit is expressed as: 
.
4
)2(
2
2
2
** FcAFMdMd 




 
                    (7) 
   If the net profit is positive, the manufacturer can directly export the product to a 
foreign country. Using equation (7), the cutoff level of the marginal cost is given by
 ,00 **  Fccc MdMdE   i.e., ,2 )4( 2
2
cFAcE 
 
  where 
.)4( 2 FA   Therefore, we summarize the direct export condition as the following 
lemma. 
 
Lemma 1 
If ,0 Ecc   then the manufacturer can export directly abroad. Otherwise, not, i.e., 
.cccE   
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Lemma 1 supports the self-selection hypothesis, indicating that exporters must 
have a productive advantage before they commerce exporting. 
 
2.2 Indirect export mode and the role of the intermediary 
Lemma 1 implies that even when expending a fixed export cost, the manufacturer can 
export abroad if its marginal cost is sufficiently low. Conversely, if the manufacturer is 
inefficient, i.e., a higher marginal cost firm, there are no exporting manufacturers 
located in the home country. However, as discussed, in exporting to various foreign 
markets, many manufacturers use wholesalers and retailers for trade intermediation. 
Here, we examine the case of an indirect export mode (see Figure 1b).  
We examine the following two-stage game. In the first stage, the manufacturer 
bargains with an intermediary over the manufacturing price of the product and the down 
payment (as security). In particular, to decide the manufacturing price, ,Midp  and the 
down payment, ,G  they play a Nash bargaining game consisting with a two-part tariff. 
In the second stage, the intermediary and the foreign firm engage in Bertrand 
competition in the foreign market. Through backward induction, we derive the subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium. 
    In contrast to the manufacturer, the intermediary competes on price in the foreign 
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market. Considering equations (1) and (2), the demand functions are given by 
,FII ppaq                                       (8) 
,IFF ppaq                                       (9) 
where subscript I denotes the intermediary. In this case, the net profit of the 
intermediary is given by: 
  ,GqtppG IMidIII                         (10) 
where we assume that the fixed export cost for the intermediary is either very low or 
negligible.6 This would hold where the intermediary has already established trading 
distribution networks and foreign subsidiaries throughout the world. 
The net profit of the foreign firm is identical to that in equation (4). Using 
equations (4) and (10), from the FOC, we obtain the following price and quantity for the 
intermediary at the Bertrand equilibrium in the second stage. 
,
4
)(2)2(
2
*



 MidI ptap                             (11) 
.
4
)2(
2
2
*



 MidI pAq                                 (12) 
The net profit of the manufacturer is then: 
  .GqcpG MidMidMidMid                      (13) 
                                                  
6 Although the intermediary incurs nonzero fixed export costs, if these are sufficiently 
lower than under the direct export mode, the analysis that follows does not change (See 
Appendix A). 
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where .*IMid qq   
    In the first stage, we investigate the following Nash bargaining game between the 
intermediary and the manufacture: 
        ,11
,
    GGVMax IMidIMidGpMid         (14) 
where   )10(    denotes the bargaining power of the manufacturer.7 First, the 
FOC with respect to G  is given by:      .0)1( 11   GGVGV MidI 
Thus, we obtain the following down payment:8 
.)1(* IMidG                                   (15) 
Substituting equation (15) into equation (14), we rewrite the former as: 
    ,** IIIMidp qtcpBBVMaxMid    
where .0)1( 1   B  Thus, the FOC with respect to the manufacturing price is 
given by:   .0)2(4)4)(2(
)4(
2222
22 

Mid
Mid
pcAB
p
V   We then 
obtain the following manufacturing price and quantity in the equilibrium of Nash 
bargaining game. 
,
)2(4
)4)(2(
2
222
*



 cApMid                          (16) 
                                                  
7 For ,1  see Appendix B. 
8 Given equation (15),  )(
2
0)(
2
* G  holds. 
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,
4
)2( 2** cAqq IMid
                               (17) 
where .0)0( *  Midqcc  The gross and net profit of the manufacturer and the an 
intermediary are then: 
    ,
)2(16
)2( *
2
222
***
MdIMidMid
cAqcp 
 
              (18) 
    ,
)2(8
)2(
2
22
*****

 
 cAG IMidMidMid        (19) 
    .
)2(8
)2()1()1( 2
22
*****

 
 cAG IMidII    (20) 
It is clear from equation (19) that the manufacturer can export the product through the 
intermediary and this differs from the direct export mode. 
 
2.3 Choice of export mode 
We now consider the optimal choice of export mode using the earlier results. Using 
equations (7) and (19), we first derive the cutoff level of marginal cost:
 ,0 ** MidMdX ccc   i.e., ,2
)2(8
2
2
EX c
FA
c 


 


 where we assume 
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


 FA )2(8
2
 and .
)4(
)2(8)1( 22
2

 
 9 An increase in the size of the foreign 
market and/or a decrease in the variable export cost (e.g., the tariff and transportation 
cost), and a fall in the fixed export cost will then increase the cutoff level of marginal 
cost, i.e., 0
dA
dcX  and .0
dF
dcX  
    In view of Lemma 1, we summarize the result as the following proposition (see 
Figure 2). 
 
Proposition 1 
(i) If ,0 Xcc   it holds that .0**  MidMd  Thus, the manufacturer chooses the 
direct export mode. 
(ii) If ,EX ccc   it holds that .0**  MdMid  Thus, the manufacturer changes the 
direct export mode to the indirect export mode. 
(iii) If ,cccE   it holds that .0 ** MdMid   Thus, the manufacturer chooses the 
                                                  
9 It is necessary for the down payment to be positive, i.e., ,0* G  such that .
2
2
   
Because ,
2
2   it always holds that .0   Suppose there is a negative down 
payment, i.e., .0* G  Then .
2
2
   In this case, if ,1    then 
.*** MdMdMid    Thus, the manufacturer necessarily chooses the indirect export 
mode. 
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indirect export mode. 
 
    Proposition 1 (i) states that an efficient manufacturer can export the product 
directly even when expending a fixed export cost. A relatively inefficient manufacturer 
will only then export the product through an intermediary. In particular, equation (18) 
implies that the gross profit in the direct export mode is greater than that in the indirect 
export mode. In this case, Propositions 1 (ii) and 1 (iii) imply that the manufacturer with 
relatively inefficient technologies conserves the fixed export cost by using an 
intermediary, and as a result, can export the product to the foreign market. 
 
 
3. “Learning-By-Exporting” Hypothesis and the Intermediary 
 
3.1 Two-period LBE model 
We develop the following two-period model. In the first period, there is a manufacturer 
unable to export the product abroad without an intermediary (because net profit would 
fall if the manufacturer exported directly), i.e., ,)1()1( Xcc   as shown in Proposition 1 
(ii) and (iii). This manufacturer will then produce export goods by choosing the indirect 
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export mode in the first period, and as a result, either production or export costs 
decrease through the effect of LBE. In the second period, the manufacturer with these 
reduced costs will then choose either the direct or indirect export mode according to the 
condition .)( )2()2( ccX  10 
In what follows, to demonstrate the conditions of choosing the direct export mode, 
in the subsequent period, given the effect of LBE, we examine reducing the production 
or fixed export costs and address the economic implications in both cases. 
    First, with a reduction of the product cost, the LBE effect implies a reduction in the 
marginal cost of producing export goods not otherwise produced without using an 
intermediary. That is, the effect of LBE is the same as that of the well-known 
learning-by-doing hypothesis. Further, the manufacturer may also absorb technological 
knowledge through competition with rival firms in the foreign market (e.g., spillover 
effects). Based on the above, we assume the following marginal cost function: 
 ,* )1()2( Midqcc   ,)1( cc     ,0* )1(  Midqc  and   .0 cc         (21) 
Second, with a reduction of the fixed export cost, the LBE effect implies that the 
manufacturer will learn various skills and abilities, and acquire information about 
                                                  
10 A manufacturer with a lower marginal cost, i.e., ,)1()1( ccX   can export without 
using an intermediary in the first period. Thus, even without the LBE effect, it can 
export directly in the second period. 
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transactions abroad through the bargaining process with the intermediary and through 
the exports themselves in the first period. It can then reduce its fixed export cost, 
especially the entry cost into the foreign market, at the beginning of the second period. 
The manufacturer will also maintain its relations and reputation with foreign customer 
at the beginning of the second period because it exported the product in the first period 
(although via an intermediary). This leads to a reduction in the entry cost, such as for 
advertising and brand awareness, for entry into the foreign market in the second period. 
Based on the above, we assume the following fixed export cost function: 
 ,* )1()2( MidqFF   ,)1( FF     ,0* )1(  MidqF  and   .0 FF     (22) 
Taking equation (22), the cutoff level of the marginal cost function is represented as: 
 ,)2()2( Fcc XX     ,0)2(  FcX  and   .XX cFc              (23) 
 
3.2 Reduction of marginal cost through the effect of LBE 
In this case, we assume that the fixed export costs in the two periods are constant and 
given, such that .)2()1( FFF   Thus, it holds that .)2()1( XXX ccc   To demonstrate 
the choice of the direct export mode in the second period, we examine the following 
condition:  .* )1()2()1( MidX qccccc   We also assume the following marginal cost 
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function for the second period    ,
1 * )1(
*
)1(
Mid
Mid q
cqc   where )(4
2 2*
)1( ccqMid    
and 0  is a parameter indicating the strength of LBE. That is, the larger the 
parameter value, the greater the reduction in marginal cost. We derive the following 
relationship: 
  ,)()( )2()2( Acc CX  The direct (indirect) mode,  (24) 
where   ,1
2
4, 2
X
X
C ccc
ccA 

   0

dA
d C  and .0d
d C   
Considering equation (24), if the strength of LBE is sufficiently large, the 
manufacturer chooses the direct export mode for the second period. For example, 
manufacturers in newly industrializing and less-developed countries have a stronger 
incentive to acquire advanced technologies and expertise, i.e., international spillover 
effects, than firms in developed countries. Thus, the strength of LBE would be 
sufficiently large. Further, if the export destinations are markets in developed countries, 
the market sizes are generally sufficiently large and the trade barriers are very low. This 
implies that the level of  ,AC  is small because parameter A  is large. Similarly, 
the level of  ,AC  is small because the bargaining power of the manufacturer in less 
developed countries is weak. Therefore, if these conditions hold, the manufacturer, 
which could not export without a trade intermediary frim in the first period, chooses the 
direct export mode in the second period. 
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3.3 Reduction of the fixed export cost through the effect of LBE 
In this case, we instead assume that the marginal costs of production in the two periods 
are constant and given, such that .)2()1( ccc   Thus, to demonstrate the choice of the 
direct export mode in the second period, we examine the following condition: 
    .)1()1()1()2()2()2( XXXXX cFFccccccFc   We assume the following 
fixed export cost function in the second period;   ,
1 * )1(
*
)1()2(
Mid
Mid q
FqFF   where 
)(
4
2 2*
)1( ccqMid    and 0  is a parameter indicating the strength of LBE. That 
is, the larger the magnitude of the parameter, the greater the reduction in the fixed 
export cost. We derive the following relationship: 
  ,)()()2( Acc FX  The direct (indirect) mode,   (25) 
where   ,
)(
)()(
2
4, 22 cc
cccc
cc
ccA XXF 



   0

dA
d F  and .0d
d F   
As shown in equation (25), and like the previous case, if the strength of LBE,   
is sufficiently large, if the market size of a foreign market is large and/or trade barriers 
are low, and if the bargaining power of the manufacturer is weak, the manufacturer 
chooses the direct export mode in the second period. 
Clearly, there is an important role of intermediaries in international transactions 
and business in the effect of LBE lowering the fixed export cost, which in turn promotes 
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international business activity of manufacturers (including trade, foreign direct 
investment, and offshoring) in developing countries.11 Related to this point, it is worth 
noting that the following empirical studies provide the evidence of the substantial 
productivity gains possible from entering export markets. For instance, De Loecker 
(2007, 2013) provides the evidence using microdata from the Slovenian manufacturing 
sector from 1994 to 2000, while Fernandes and Isgut (2015) examine the LBE 
hypothesis for Colombian manufacturing plants from 1981 to 1991 and likewise provide 
significant evidence in its favor.12 Combined with Ahn et al. (2011) and Bai et al. 
(2017), these empirical studies together suggest that by using intermediaries, 
manufacturers in developing countries such as China, Slovenia, and Colombia in 
previous periods can directly export to advanced countries with large market sizes and 
liberalized trade in subsequent periods. 
 
  
                                                  
11 See Peng and Ilinictch (1998, Table 1, p. 621), which for a listing of major export 
trading companies in developing countries, including Japan in the Meiji era, from the 
late 19th to 20th centuries. Rauch (1998) discusses Japan’s Sogo Shosha. 
12 See also Martins and Yang (2009), and Silva et al. (2012). 
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4. Conclusion 
 
The model in this paper is a partial equilibrium analysis and thus differs from those 
drawn from heterogeneous firm trade theory (e.g., Melitz, 2003; Helpman, et al., 2004; 
Helpman, 2006). However, using the model, we derived similar results as previous 
studies such that a productivity efficient manufacturer (one with a lower marginal cost 
of production) can export abroad directly, even though incurring trade costs. 
Nevertheless, even a relatively productivity inefficient manufacturer (one with a higher 
marginal cost of production) can export abroad indirectly via a trade intermediary. 
We also considered the LBE hypothesis to better focus on the role of 
intermediation. In particular, a manufacturer using an intermediary in previous periods 
can export directly in subsequent periods. This implies a change in export mode (i.e., 
from indirect to direct exports) through the LBE effect. We examined this hypothesis in 
the situations of a reduction in the marginal cost of production and the fixed export cost, 
and demonstrated the conditions needed for a change in export mode. Our theoretical 
findings also found support in existing empirical findings in that manufacturers in 
developing countries, which have strong incentives to absorb technological skills, to 
build brand image and reputation, and to maintain customer relationships in foreign 
markets, are likely to export directly to advanced countries, given their markets are 
large and their trade barriers low. 
We appreciate that our model is very specific through the need to simplify the 
analysis, e.g., linear demand functions, Bertrand duopoly, a Nash bargaining between 
manufacturer and intermediary over a two-part tariff, and specified marginal production 
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and fixed cost functions. It would be a useful research direction to relax these 
specifications and provide the more general case. In particular, we used a simple 
two-period model in which the manufacturer exports abroad using an intermediary in 
the first period. In future research, we intend to develop a theoretical model of the 
dynamic discrete choice of export mode, corresponding to the empirical work of Das et 
al. (2007) and Bai et al. (2017). 
 
 
Appendix A: The case of an intermediary with a fixed export cost 
Revising equation (10) as follows: 
  ,GfqtppG IMidIIIf                    (A.1) 
where 0f  is the fixed export cost incurred by the intermediary.  
The cutoff level of marginal costs is then: 
,
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where we assume .fF   it is necessary for the following condition to hold EXf cc  :  
.)4( 22 fF                                       (A.3) 
In this case, equations (19) and (20) are rewritten as: 
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Thus, if it holds that   fcA  )2(8 )2( 2
22

  then 0* Midf  and .0*  If  Taking 
equations (7) and (A.3), we derive the following relationship: 
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Appendix B: Price leader manufacturer case; 1  
If ,1  we revise equation (14): .
,
GVMax dMidMiGpMid
    This suggests the 
profit function of a manufacturer as a price leader ( diM  ) or an upstream firm in a 
vertical structure. Because ,0G  the optimal price and quantity are given by: 
)2(2
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Thus, we have the following profit: 
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 cAdMi                              (B.1) 
    Comparing the gross profit in the direct export case with that in the indirect export 
case, it holds that .** dMiMd    With respect to the net profits, i.e. equations (7) and 
(B.1), if ,
34
)2()4(2 2
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 FA  the following cutoff level of a marginal cost exists: 
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Therefore, unless ,0  Proposition 1 is robust. 
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Figure 1a: Direct export mode in the presence of export costs 
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Figure 1b: Indirect export via an intermediary 
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Figure 2: Choice of export mode 
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